Far From a  Dead Letter : The Contract Clause and \u3cem\u3eNorth Carolina Association of Educators v. State\u3c/em\u3e by Tobin, Tommy
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 96 | Number 6 Article 2
9-1-2018
Far From a "Dead Letter": The Contract Clause and
North Carolina Association of Educators v. State
Tommy Tobin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tommy Tobin, Far From a "Dead Letter": The Contract Clause and North Carolina Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 1681
(2017).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol96/iss6/2
96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018) 
FAR FROM A “DEAD LETTER”: THE 
CONTRACT CLAUSE AND NORTH CAROLINA 
ASSOCIATION OF EDUCATORS V. STATE* 
TOMMY TOBIN** 
The Contract Clause, which prohibits state interference with the 
obligations of contracts, has fallen from its prior preeminence in 
American jurisprudence. During early American history, in the 
words of the Supreme Court, the Contract Clause “was perhaps 
the strongest single constitutional check on state legislation.” In 
1878, the Court declared that there “was no more important 
provision in the federal Constitution” than the Contract Clause. 
Yet, years later, the Contract Clause was so rarely invoked and of 
such “negligible importance” that some argued that it may as 
well have been “stricken from the Constitution.” For much of the 
twentieth century, the Contract Clause was more of a historical 
footnote than a prevailing argument. 
A recent case in the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
demonstrates the renewed prominence of the Contract Clause. 
The case, North Carolina Association of Educators v. State, 
concerned a challenge to a state statute that revoked career status 
for teachers. The state supreme court struck down the state statute 
on Contract Clause grounds. 
Rather than a dead letter, the Contract Clause remains relevant in 
modern times. This Article provides a concise overview of the 
Contract Clause and an analysis of this recently decided North 
Carolina case. The case and its treatment of the Contract Clause 
present lessons for jurists and litigants in North Carolina and 
across the country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What the state giveth, so may the state taketh away? When it 
comes to contracts with the states, the answer is no, due to the 
Constitution’s Contract Clause.1 In relevant part, the Clause 
forecloses the ability of states to “pass any .	.	. [l]aw impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”2 The Clause prohibits states from taking 
actions that would retroactively interfere with obligations that arise 
under contract.3 
The Contract Clause was a response to considerable historical 
need during America’s founding period. In Federalist No. 44, James 
Madison noted that the “sober people of America” were “weary of 
the fluctuating policy” of legislative interferences in cases affecting 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §	10, cl. 1. 
 2. Id. For a definitive treatment of the Contract Clause from its origins to the 
modern day, see generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2016). 
 3. Elmer W. Roller, The Impairment of Contract Obligations and Vested Rights, 6 
MARQ. L. REV. 129, 129 (1922). 
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personal rights.4 Madison argued that the Clause was a “constitutional 
bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights.”5 In Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s characterization, the state intrusion upon 
contracts at the time of the founding “had become so great, so 
alarming, as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten 
the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and 
destroy the sanctity of private faith.”6 
Chief Justice Marshall posited having all contracts subject to 
legislative control would be untenable, for to do so would mean that 
each contract would contain a condition that its obligations might be 
discharged as the legislature prescribed.7 In Marshall’s reasoning, 
states were “restrained from impairing the obligation of contracts, but 
they furnish[ed] the remedy to enforce them, and administer[ed] that 
remedy in tribunals constituted by themselves.”8 Put another way, if 
there was no Contract Clause, states entering into contracts could 
cancel the contract by edict while also setting the law by which 
contracts disputes are adjudicated.9 
This Article explores the Contract Clause within the context of a 
recently decided Supreme Court of North Carolina case, North 
Carolina Association of Educators v. State10 (“NCAE” or “NCAE v. 
State”). The case resulted from State actions that had the effect of 
eliminating tenure over time for public school teachers who had such 
status and prohibiting those that did not from ever obtaining tenure, 
or more technically termed, achieving “career status.”11 Ultimately, 
the case was decided on Contract Clause grounds, with the state 
supreme court ruling that the removal of career status for teachers 
was unconstitutional and violative of the Contract Clause.12 
The ruling in NCAE v. State demonstrates the continuing 
relevance of the Contract Clause, which was once thought to be a 
dead letter. Demonstrating that the Contract Clause is far from 
 
 4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 229 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 354–55 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., 
dissenting) (discussing his concerns about a legislature’s power to change the “relative 
situation of debtor and creditor,” which “had been used to such an excess by the state 
legislatures”). 
 7. See id. at 339. 
 8. Id. at 350–51; see also JASON MRAZ, The Remedy (I Won’t Worry), on WAITING 
FOR MY ROCKET TO COME (Elektra 2002) (“[Y]ou were born on the Fourth of July .	.	. 
[A]nd what kind of God would serve this? We will cure this dirty old disease.”). 
 9. See Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 352–53 (Marshall, C.J., dissenting). 
 10. 368 N.C. 777, 786 S.E.2d 255 (2016). 
 11. Id. at 779, 786 S.E.2d at 257–58. 
 12. Id. at 792–93, 786 S.E.2d at 266. 
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obsolete, the NCAE ruling presents powerful Contract Clause 
argumentation that can shape the future of public employee tenure 
across the country.13 While teacher tenure politics are controversial, 
the constitutional questions involving the Contract Clause are salient 
across various domains and contexts.14 
Part One provides a concise overview of the Contract Clause and 
the historical antecedents for the state supreme court’s decision in 
NCAE v. State. Part Two explores the NCAE case in depth, from the 
trial court opinion to that of the state supreme court, paying 
particular attention to the jurists’ use of Contract Clause arguments. 
Part Three considers public employment law principles generally. 
Part Four reviews public employment law in North Carolina. Part 
Five utilizes the framework of the NCAE case to analyze the case’s 
and the Contract Clause’s potential applicability to other public 
employees in North Carolina and around the country.  
I.  CONTRACT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
The Contract Clause was, for a time, one of the most heavily 
litigated provisions of the Constitution.15 Until the late 1800s, no 
other clause, apart from the Commerce Clause, was the subject of the 
Supreme Court’s attention more than the Contract Clause.16 As one 
example, the Supreme Court found that a corporate charter given to 
Dartmouth College could not be modified by state law without the 
express reservation of the power to modify that contract.17 According 
to one estimate, the Clause had been considered by the Court in 
approximately forty percent of its cases involving the validity of state 
legislation prior to 1889.18 The Contract Clause was “the most widely 
used protection of individual property rights against state regulation” 
 
 13. Tommy Tobin, N.C. Case May Change Teacher Tenure in U.S., CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article7338
2107.html [http://perma.cc/M9D9-KKST]. 
 14. For example, the Supreme Court recently decided a case regarding the 
applicability of the Contract Clause to a life insurance question. See Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. 
Ct. 1815, 1824–26 (2018) (holding that Minnesota’s retroactive application of a law 
nullifying an ex-spouse’s beneficiary designation on a life-insurance policy does not violate 
the Contract Clause). 
 15. James W. Ely, Jr., The Contract Clause During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 
41 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 257, 272 (2016). 
 16. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 91–92 (1938). 
 17. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819).  
 18. WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 95. 
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and was so successful that nearly half of the state laws challenged 
under the Clause were declared invalid by the Court.19 
In 1878, Justice William Strong wrote that there was “no more 
important provision in the Federal Constitution than the one which 
prohibits States from passing laws impairing the obligation of 
contracts.”20 For Justice Strong, protecting the Contract Clause was 
“one of the highest duties” of the Court so as “to take care the 
prohibition shall neither be evaded nor frittered away.”21 Indeed, in 
the words of a later Court, the Contract Clause “was perhaps the 
strongest single constitutional check on state legislation during our 
early years as a Nation.”22 
Following the 1870s and the rise of due process theories rooted 
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Contract Clause 
experienced a considerable decline in both relevance and utility in 
constitutional argumentation.23 The Contract Clause fell into disfavor 
because the Due Process Clause had a far broader scope of 
application.24 Courts wrestling with the Contract Clause had to 
overcome its limitations, such as when individual contractual rights 
faced countervailing pressures from states articulating their 
“inalienable” police power.25 One of the limitations involved with the 
application of the Contract Clause is the inherent tension between a 
state’s abilities to regulate under their police powers, including 
furnishing remedies, and the Clause’s prohibition on limitations 
regarding the obligations of contract.26 In addition to this remedies-
obligations distinction, the Contract Clause was also limited in its 
application to current contracts, not contracts that were contemplated 
 
 19. Janet Irene Levine, The Contract Clause: A Constitutional Basis for Invalidating 
State Legislation, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 927, 930 (1979) (quoting WRIGHT, supra note 16, 
at 95). 
 20. Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 448 (1878). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978). 
 23. See Ely, supra note 15, at 272 (“[T]he decade of the 1870s constituted a high water 
mark for the significance of the Contract Clause in constitutional history.”); Levine, supra 
note 19, at 930–31. 
 24. Carlen A. Petersen, The Contract Clause: The Use of a Strict Standard of Review 
for State Legislation That Impairs Private Contracts—Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 506 (1979). As noted by the Court itself, “the 
Contract Clause receded into comparative desuetude with the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and particularly with the development of the large body of jurisprudence 
under the Due Process Clause of that Amendment in modern constitutional history.” 
Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 241.  
 25. See Petersen, supra note 24, at 506. 
 26. See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200–01 (1819) 
(discussing whether imprisonment for a debt was a remedy or obligation of the contract).  
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or possible in the future.27 Courts, going into the New Deal, needed to 
square the constitutional grant of state police powers with the 
Contract Clause’s restriction of those powers. 
In 1934, Home Building & Loan Ass’n. v. Blaisdell28 ushered in 
another era of Contract Clause jurisprudence, aiming to balance the 
competing interests of state power against the restrictions of the 
Contract Clause. The Blaisdell Court attempted to bring balance to 
the force of the Contract Clause: 
Undoubtedly, whatever is reserved of state power must be 
consistent with the fair intent of the constitutional limitation of 
that power. The reserved power cannot be construed so as to 
destroy the limitation, nor is the limitation to be construed to 
destroy the reserved power in its essential aspects. They must 
be construed in harmony with each other.29 
Subsequent courts have noted that Blaisdell stands for the 
proposition that the prohibitions of the Contract Clause “must be 
accommodated to the inherent police power of the State to safeguard 
the vital interests of its people.”30 The Blaisdell decision was used 
subsequently to provide for “lenient evaluation[s] of state legislation 
that impair[ed] contracts.”31 Following Blaisdell, the Court came to 
apply a loose test that balanced the means and ends of state action. 
For example, the Court in City of El Paso v. Simmons32 deferred to 
the “wide discretion on the part of the legislature in determining what 
is and what is not necessary.”33 The Court has even gone so far as to 
say that state police power is “an implied condition of every 
contract,” which is “as much part of the contract as though it were 
written into it” and that a “[s]tate’s exercise of its power enforces, and 
does not impair, a contract.”34 The Court’s finding that the power of 
the state “is not diminished because a private contract may be 
affected” is demonstrative of the extent to which the balancing test 
threatened to eviscerate the Contract Clause, tipping the balance in 
favor of upholding the challenged action.35 
 
 27. Petersen, supra note 24, at 505; see also WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 28.  
 28. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 29. Id. at 439. 
 30. Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) 
(quoting Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434). 
 31. Levine, supra note 19, at 931.  
 32. 379 U.S. 497 (1965). 
 33. Id. at 508–09 (quoting E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945)). 
 34. E.N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232 (1945).  
 35. Id. at 233. 
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Following the New Deal’s balancing test that favored state 
action, the Contract Clause’s continued vitality was held in doubt. 
Indeed, only one time in the thirty-seven years from 1940 until 1977 
did the Supreme Court find state action unconstitutional as violating 
the Contract Clause.36 Leading contemporary constitutional 
commentators argued that “the clause [was] of negligible importance, 
and might well be stricken from the Constitution.”37 Some have 
argued that the emergence of Due Process Clause jurisprudence led 
to the same results as “if the [C]ontract [C]lause were dropped out of 
the Constitution, and the challenged statutes all judged as reasonable 
or unreasonable deprivations of property.”38 
The late 1970s brought a pair of cases, United States Trust Co. of 
New York v. New Jersey39 and Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus,40 that revitalized the Clause’s utility in constitutional 
argumentation.41 In United States Trust Co., the states of New York 
and New Jersey passed legislation repealing a statutory covenant, 
which had the effect of modifying the terms of certain bonds.42 The 
Court found for the bondholders on Contract Clause grounds43 and 
articulated the modern test for judicial review of Contract Clause 
cases involving public contracts: whether an impairment to a contract 
is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.44 
This test was a departure from Blaisdell’s balancing test, that the 
police power of a state would sustain state action if that action was 
addressed “to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable 
and appropriate to that end.”45 Not only would state actions need to 
serve an important purpose but the methods used would now need to 
be both reasonable and necessary to achieve that purpose. 
Over time, the United States Trust Co. test has been articulated 
as a three-pronged analysis, wherein courts inquire “(1) whether a 
contractual obligation is present, (2) whether the state’s actions 
 
 36. Levine, supra note 19, at 938 n.75. That case was Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 
369 (1941). 
 37. HAROLD W. CHASE & CRAIG R. DUCAT, EDWARD S. CORWIN’S THE 
CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 105 (13th ed. 1973). 
 38. Robert L. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause: III, 57 HARV. L. 
REV. 852, 890–91 (1944). 
 39. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 40. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
 41. See Jordan Bleznick, Comment, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 
195, 195 (1978). 
 42. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 9–10, 14. 
 43. Id. at 32. 
 44. See id. at 25. 
 45. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438 (1934). 
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impaired that contract, and (3) whether the impairment was 
reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”46 
The United States Trust Co. Court found a state was not “completely 
free to consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on par 
with other policy alternatives” the state was considering.47 
The United States Trust Co. case involved state bonds sold with a 
particular covenant, which the state had retroactively repealed years 
later to free money for other purposes. Reciting the facts, the Court 
noted that the covenant’s purpose was to invoke the Contract Clause 
as a security against repeal for the bondholders.48 In this context, the 
Court analyzed the differences between a state action affecting 
private contracts and those actions that impaired the obligations of a 
state’s own contracts. The Court found a different basis for reserved 
police power arguments when the state affected its own contracts, as 
the state’s self-interest was at stake.49 The United States Trust Co. 
Court noted that a state’s own contracts would face greater judicial 
scrutiny under the Contract Clause than would laws regulating 
contractual relationships between private parties.50 To this point, the 
Court wrote, 
A governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, 
especially when taxes do not have to be raised. If a State could 
reduce its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the 
money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, the 
Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.51 
In United States Trust Co., the Court had the opportunity to read 
the Contract Clause out of the Constitution. It chose not to do so. 
Instead, the Court noted that the Contract Clause exists and limits 
state action.52 In 1978, a second Supreme Court case, Allied, made it 
even more clear: “the Contract Clause remains part of the 
Constitution. It is not a dead letter.”53 
 
 46. Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 141, 500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (1998) (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of 
N.Y., 431 U.S. 1, 17–32); see also Gen. Motors v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) 
(inquiring “whether the impairment [was] substantial,” as required by the third prong). 
 47. U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 431 U.S. at 30–31. 
 48. Id. at 18. 
 49. Id. at 25–26. 
 50. See id. at 22–26. 
 51. Id. at 26. 
 52. Id. at 16 (noting that case law does not indicate that “the Contract Clause [is] 
without meaning in modern constitutional jurisprudence, or that its limitation on state 
power [is] illusory”). 
 53. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978). 
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In Allied, the Court wrestled with a Minnesota law that affected 
employee pension plans and associated fees. The Court noted that the 
“severity of the impairment” to the contractual obligations “measures 
the height of the hurdle the state legislature must clear.”54 In 
evaluating the application of the Contract Clause to modern times 
after United States Trust Co., the Allied Court noted that “[i]f the 
Contract Clause is to retain any meaning at all .	.	. it must be 
understood to impose some limits upon the power of a State to 
abridge existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its 
otherwise legitimate police power.”55 Whereas United States Trust Co. 
evaluated the impairment of a contract with the state, Allied extended 
the Court’s revitalized Contract Clause standards to private 
contracts.56 After United States Trust Co. and Allied, the Contract 
Clause serves as a limitation on states when they enact new 
legislation, even when a statute details its intended benefits to 
society.57 
Today, United States Trust Co. and Allied guide modern jurists 
and litigants in assessing whether state actions violate the prohibitions 
of the Contract Clause.58 Even so, the utilization and relevance of 
Contract Clause jurisprudence remains far less common today than in 
its nineteenth century heyday. For example, cases involving public 
employees have more commonly utilized due process arguments 
rather than the Contract Clause.59 The use of Contract Clause 
jurisprudence regarding public employees has been relatively rare 
compared to arguments relating to due process rights.60 Between the 
United States Trust Co. decision in 1977 and 1990, the Supreme Court 
 
 54. Id. at 245.  
 55. Id. at 242.  
 56. See Petersen, supra note 24, at 518.  
 57. Id.  
 58. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Schs., 876 F.3d 926, 932 (7th 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2624 (2018) (mem.); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Melin, 853 
F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 2017), rev’d sub nom. Sveen v. Melin, 138 S. Ct. 1815 (2018); Nev. 
Emps. Ass’n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1990). See generally Ely, supra note 
15, at 241–45 (describing the Contract Clause within a more recent context). 
 59. See Recent Case, North Carolina Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State, No. 13 CVS 
16240, 2014 WL 4952101 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 5, 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 995, 997–98 
(“Although the Supreme Court has more commonly analyzed tenure rights through the 
lens of due process, New Deal–era precedent recognizes that constitutionally protected 
contractual rights may inhere in the legislative grant of teacher tenure.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 60. See id. 
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did not examine the constitutionality of a public contract under the 
Contract Clause.61 
However, several more modern cases at the intermediate 
appellate court level have attacked state actions on Contract Clause 
grounds. One case in the Fourth Circuit involved a teachers’ union in 
Baltimore that alleged that a new furlough program resulting in salary 
reductions violated the Contract Clause as an impermissible 
impairment of their contracts with the city.62 The Fourth Circuit ruled 
that the augmentations to the teachers’ contracts did not violate the 
Contract Clause given the necessity due to the city’s fiscal 
circumstances at that time. The Fourth Circuit panel went so far as to 
note that the judiciary may not be the proper forum for such a 
challenge: 
The authority of the states to impair contracts, to be sure, must 
be constrained in some meaningful way. The Contract Clause, 
however, does not require the courts—even where public 
contracts have been impaired—to sit as superlegislatures, 
determining, for example, whether it would have been more 
appropriate instead for Baltimore to close its schools for a 
week, an option actually considered but rejected, or to reduce 
funding to the arts, as appellees argue should have been done. 
Not only are we ill-equipped even to consider the evidence that 
would be relevant to such conflicting policy alternatives; we 
have no objective standards against which to assess the merit of 
the multitude of alternatives.63 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit panel noted that the circumstances 
of public employees were unique and the terms of their public 
employment may need to change during certain times. The court 
ruled that: “[p]ublic employees—federal or state—by definition serve 
the public and their expectations are necessarily defined, at least in 
part, by the public interest.”64 
 
 61. Nev. Emps. Ass’n, 903 F.2d at 1226 (“The Supreme Court has not examined the 
constitutionality of a state law which impairs a public contract since Trust Co.”). 
 62. Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 63. Id. at 1021–22. But see Mass. Cmty. Coll. v. Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 716 
(Mass. 1995) (finding that unpaid furloughs for certain state employees violated the 
Contract Clause); Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 609 A.2d 1204, 1211 (N.H. 1992) 
(“[T]he state cannot resort to contract violations to solve its financial problems.”). 
 64. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021 (“It should not be wholly unexpected, 
therefore, that these public servants might well be called upon to sacrifice first when the 
public interest demands sacrifice.”). 
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In 1997, the First Circuit heard a challenge from Maine public 
school teachers relating to alterations to the state’s public pensions.65 
The circuit court reversed the district court’s finding of a Contract 
Clause violation, reasoning that the Contract Clause required clear 
and unmistakable evidence that the state intended to bind itself 
contractually, using the aptly named “unmistakability doctrine” of 
Contract Clause jurisprudence.66 The panel ruled that “[a]s Contract 
Clause challenges arise,” courts must look to the language of statutes 
“to determine, as a threshold matter, whether the unmistakability 
doctrine is satisfied.”67   
Before the Second Circuit, a teachers’ union in Buffalo attacked 
state actions passed in relation to the city’s fiscal crisis, including a 
wage freeze that had the effect of nullifying a two percent wage 
increase that the unions had negotiated as part of their labor contracts 
with the city.68 The court found that the temporary wage freeze 
satisfied the three-prong test, as it was both necessary and reasonable 
to achieve the important public purpose of stabilizing Buffalo’s 
precarious fiscal position, particularly because of the prospective and 
temporary nature of the wage freeze.69 
In a case from the Ninth Circuit, public employees in Hawaii 
challenged a statute that would enable the state to postpone the 
issuance of their paychecks by a few days.70 In conducting a Contract 
Clause analysis at the preliminary injunction stage, the panel found in 
favor of the public employees, reasoning that the state’s interference 
with the public employees’ contractual rights to prompt payment 
were substantial.71 The court reminded the state that the public 
employee plaintiffs were “wage earners, not volunteers” and had a 
“right to rely on the timely receipt of their paychecks.”72 
The above review is not intended as a comprehensive treatment 
of all cases arising under the Contract Clause across the country since 
the nation’s founding. Instead, it is meant to provide historical and 
 
 65. Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 66. Id. at 5 (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17–18 n.14 (noting 
that a statute may be treated as a binding contract “when the language and the 
circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature 
enforceable against the state”)). 
 67. Id. at 9. 
 68. See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 367 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 69. See id. at 371–72. 
 70. Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 71. See id. at 1106. 
 72. Id. (“Even a brief delay in getting paid can cause financial embarrassment and 
displacement of varying degrees of magnitude.”). 
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legal context to the Supreme Court North Carolina’s decision in 
NCAE v. State. In that case, the state supreme court found itself with 
a challenge to state action that would have retroactively revoked 
tenure, also known as “career status,” for teachers.  
II.  APPLYING THE CONTRACT CLAUSE—NCAE V. STATE 
The NCAE litigation provides a clear example of the modern 
salience of the Contract Clause: state action affecting the rights of 
parties to contracts with the state. Specifically, the plaintiffs 
challenged a state law repealing tenured status for those that had 
obtained this protected classification. In effect, the case may “give 
pause to those seeking to eliminate tenure in any respect.”73 As such, 
the reasoning of each layer of judicial review is important to more 
fully appreciate the relevance of the case to other public employees in 
the state and around the country. 
In June 2014, Judge Robert H. Hobgood ruled, inter alia, that 
the repeal of the Career Status Law violated the Contract Clause.74 In 
June 2015, the North Carolina intermediate appellate court upheld 
the ruling.75 In April 2016, the state supreme court again upheld the 
trial court’s decision on Contract Clause grounds, effectively 
demonstrating that the Clause is far from a dead letter.76 
A. Trial Court Ruling 
The NCAE teachers first brought their challenge in Wake 
County trial court, where the judge applied United States Trust Co.’s 
three-prong test and determined that the repeal of teacher tenure for 
career status teachers was unconstitutional, as it upset protected 
contract rights. As noted above, courts utilizing the United States 
Trust Co. test must consider “(1) whether a contractual obligation is 
present, (2) whether the state’s actions impaired that contract, and (3) 
 
 73. Recent Case, supra note 59, at 1001. 
 74. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, No. 13 CVS 16240, 2014 WL 4952101, at *5, 
(N.C. Super. Ct. June 6, 2014). The trial court also examined a provision by which teachers 
were incentivized to voluntarily relinquish their career status, which was determined to be 
inseparable from the revocation of career status itself. It was struck down as violative of 
the constitutional vagueness doctrine as it “provide[d] no discernible, workable standards 
to guide local school districts in its implementation.” Id. As this so-called “25% Provision” 
was deemed inseparable from the repeal of career status, this paper will focus on the 
revocation of career status. Id. 
 75. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 241 N.C. App. 284, 305, 776 S.E.2d 1, 16 (2015). 
 76. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 792, 786 S.E.2d 255, 266 (2016). 
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whether the impairment was reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose.”77 
In its application of the three-pronged United States Trust Co. 
test, the trial court first found that the teachers who had earned 
career status prior to Career Status Repeal on July 26, 2013 “have 
contractual rights in that status and to the protections established by 
the Career Status Law.”78 Next, the trial court found that the state’s 
actions had the effect of eliminating the law’s contractual protections 
and, therefore, “substantially impair[ed] the contractual rights of 
career status teachers.”79 Finally, the court concluded that the 
impairment of these contractual rights “was not reasonable and 
necessary to serve an important public purpose.”80 The trial court was 
particularly clear, writing that “[e]ven if there was an actual need for 
school administrators to have greater latitude to dismiss ineffective 
career status teachers, that objective could have been accomplished 
through less drastic means, such as by amending the grounds for 
dismissing teachers for performance-related reasons.”81 
The trial court’s reasoning was straightforward: the teachers 
accepted the terms of their contracts when they accepted their jobs. 
These terms included the employee benefit for career status eligibility 
and became part of the offer of employment, on which the teachers 
relied when they accepted the terms.82 The judge therefore found that 
the state action interfered with the terms of the contract for those 
teachers whose rights had vested. 
The trial court also examined the state’s law of the land provision 
as an independent additional ground for its ruling.83 This provision 
operates similarly to a takings claim and represents a more 
conventional due process-based argument.84 Under the law of the 
land clause of the North Carolina Constitution, the state is not able to 
deprive individuals of their property except by the “law of the land.”85 
North Carolina courts have interpreted this state constitutional clause 
 
 77. Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 141, 500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (1998) (citing U.S. Tr. Co. of 
N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17–32 (1997)). 
 78. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 2014 WL 4952101, at *4. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at *5. 
 82. Id. at *4. 
 83. Id. at *5 (“Contract rights, including those created by statute, constitute property 
rights that are within the Law of the Land Clause’s guarantee against uncompensated 
takings.”). 
 84. See Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 195–96, 293 S.E.2d 101, 107–08 (1982). 
 85. N.C. CONST. art. I, §	19 (“No person shall be .	.	. in any manner deprived of his .	.	. 
property, but by the law of the land.”). 
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as prohibiting government takings of property without just 
compensation.86 Additionally, North Carolina courts have ruled that 
government takings of property also provide procedural protections 
of private rights against the lawmaking power of the legislature.87 
Here, the trial court found that the contractual rights of career 
teachers constituted property that could not be “taken” by the state 
without just compensation.88 
Indeed, Bailey v. State’s law of the land test provided a strong 
foundation for the trial court’s determination of both prongs of its 
takings analysis.89 The court cited Bailey to support its ruling that 
career status teachers had vested property rights in their public 
employment contracts. In doing so, the court considered: (a) whether 
there was a property right involved and (b) whether that property 
right had been subject to a government taking without just 
compensation.90 
Relying on Bailey, the trial judge distinguished the contractual 
rights of career status teachers with those who had not yet achieved 
career status.91 Bailey analyzed the state’s retirement benefit 
programs that had been in place for state and local employees from 
1939 to 1989. Inter alia, the state legislature in 1989 changed a 
taxation exemption for retirement benefits from one that was 
unlimited to one that had a maximum of $4000 on annual benefits 
that would be exempted from state taxation.92 The Bailey court 
examined the contractual rights of the public employees and found 
that the contractual right to rely on the terms of the retirement plan 
existed at the moment at which the retirement benefit rights vested.93 
Accordingly, the Bailey court determined that all public employees 
whose retirement benefits had vested prior to the enactment of the 
 
 86. See Long, 306 N.C. at 195–96, 293 S.E.2d at 107–08. 
 87. Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 142–43, 500 S.E.2d 54, 61 (1998) (citing Trs. of the 
Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. 58, 88 (1805)). 
 88. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 2014 WL 4952101, at *5. 
 89. Id. (citing Bailey, 348 N.C. at 154, 500 S.E.2d at 68). 
 90. Id. The fact that the career status was not referred to as a “contract” does not 
control the case, as the career status rights could be expressed as contractual rights 
without the explicit word “contract” being used. See Recent Case, supra note 59, at 999 
n.41. 
 91. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 2014 WL 4952101, at *5. 
 92. Bailey, 348 N.C. at 139, 500 S.E.2d at 59. 
 93. Id. at 141–42, 500 S.E.2d at 60–61 (citing Simpson v. N.C. Local Gov’t Emps. Ret. 
Sys., 88 N.C. App. 218, 223–24, 345 S.E.2d 90, 94 (1987)); see also Faulkenbury v. 
Teachers’ and State Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 345 N.C. 683, 690, 483 S.E.2d 422, 427 (1997) 
(affirming Bailey’s reliance on the principal that “the relation between the employees and 
the governmental units [is] contractual”). 
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1989 cap must be exempt from the state tax, regardless of whether the 
benefits would be attributable to work prior to or after the 1989 
enactment.94 The tax exemption had become a term or condition of 
the retirement system to which the public employees had a 
contractual right.95 In articulating the relationship between the law of 
the land and contract rights, the Bailey court found that “[t]he basis of 
the contractual relationship determinations in these and related cases 
is the principle that where a party in entering an obligation relies on 
the State, he or she obtains vested rights that cannot be diminished by 
subsequent state action.”96 
Applying Bailey to the instant case, the trial court found that 
contract-based property rights vested upon obtaining career status.97 
As such, the court denied standing to teachers who were currently in 
their probationary periods and had not yet achieved career status.98 
For plaintiff-teachers who had achieved career status, the court held 
that their rights had vested and the repeal of the career status 
constituted a taking without compensation.99 
B. Court of Appeals’ Majority Opinion 
The trial court’s decision was appealed to the North Carolina 
Court of Appeals on both of its independent grounds: first, that the 
repeal of Career Status violated both the Contracts Clause of the 
United States Constitution and, second, that repeal violated the law 
of the land clause of the state constitution.100 Two appellate judges 
upheld the trial court ruling, with the third concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
The appellate court, reviewing the matter de novo, dutifully 
applied the United States Trust Co. test.101 The appellate court first 
examined whether contractual obligations existed between the 
teachers and the state.102 Inter alia, the state argued that previous 
federal and state precedent was distinguishable and that it would be 
more appropriate to consider the individual teacher’s contracts with 
 
 94. Bailey, 348 N.C. at 142, 500 S.E.2d at 61. 
 95. Id. at 146, 500 S.E.2d at 63. 
 96. Id. at 144, 500 S.E.2d at 62. 
 97. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, No. 13 CVS 16240, 2014 WL 4952101, at *4, 
(N.C. Super. Ct. June 6, 2014). 
 98. Id. at *5. 
 99. Id. 
 100. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 241 N.C. App. 284, 286, 776 S.E.2d 1, 4 (2015). 
 101. See id. at 293, 776 S.E.2d at 8–9. 
 102. See id. at 294, 776 S.E.2d at 9. 
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the individual school districts rather than with the state itself.103 In 
short, a teacher was not contracting with the state when he or she 
obtained tenure; instead, the vested contract right existed between 
the teacher and the individual school district. The court of appeals 
called this approach “totally baseless”104 and “wholly 
unpersuasive.”105 In addition to federal and state precedent dating 
back to 1938,106 the court relied upon the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s more recent ruling in Wiggs v. Edgecombe County.107 
In Wiggs, a county law enforcement official retired early after 
decades of service and received a “special separation allowance” 
under state law.108 Subsequently, he took up part-time employment 
working as a police officer at a local airport.109 The county reacted to 
this news by passing a retroactive resolution that would curtail 
“special separation allowances” when a retiree obtained employment 
with another local government entity.110 Relying on the Contract 
Clause, the Wiggs court held that the county did not have authority to 
pass a retroactive restriction that would apply to a vested contractual 
right.111 
According to the court of appeals in NCAE, the public school 
teachers were similarly situated to Officer Wiggs. Both cases 
demonstrated the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s “long-standing 
recognition that when the General Assembly revokes valuable 
employment benefits that are obtained in reliance on a statute and 
that offset the relatively low salaries of public employees, it violates 
the Contract Clause.”112 
In reaching its conclusion on the first prong of the United States 
Trust Co. standard, the court of appeals buffeted its reasoning with 
policy arguments arising from labor economics.113 According to the 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 299, 776 S.E.2d at 12. 
 106. Id. (rejecting the State’s attempt to distinguish the North Carolina Career Law 
statute from the statute at issue in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938)). 
 107. Id. at 296, 776 S.E.2d at 10 (citing Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 324, 
643 S.E.2d 904, 908 (2007)). 
 108. Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 319, 643 S.E.2d 904, 905 (2007). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 324, 643 S.E.2d at 908. 
 112. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 297, 776 S.E.2d at 10. 
 113. Id. at 297–98, 776 S.E.2d at 10–11. Indeed, the NCAE court devoted over a full 
page of its ruling to an extended quote from a labor economist, who noted that teachers’ 
salaries make career status protections more valuable than they otherwise would be, as 
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court, the career status served as a statutory promise upon which the 
teacher relied as an inducement to enter public employment and 
remain in the low-paying position.114 In doing so, the state benefited 
from experienced teachers, and the teachers benefited from this 
valuable employment protection. 
With regard to United States Trust Co.’s second prong, the court 
of appeals similarly found for the public school teachers, calling it 
“not a difficult question.”115 For the court, the impact upon the 
contractual obligation was obvious from the facts: under the career 
status provision, the plaintiff-teachers would have continuing 
contracts, whereas the career status repeal would limit these contracts 
to a maximum of four years.116 Once a contractual obligation is 
recognized, North Carolina precedent appears to favor a finding of 
substantial impairment in the areas of both retirement benefits, like in 
Bailey,117 and additional payments, like in Wiggs.118 
The State argued that the career status was merely a contract 
modification and that the plaintiffs should have lodged a breach of 
contract claim. Even if the contract was impaired, the State argued, 
the modification was not a significant impairment.119 In support, the 
State pointed to a recent Fourth Circuit case that upheld a city’s 
modification of its pension plan from a variable benefit to a cost-of-
living adjustment under applicable state law contract doctrine.120 The 
court of appeals was unpersuaded, noting that the authority cited by 
the State was “misconstrue[d]” and “not even remotely applicable to 
the present facts.”121 Indeed, the court found that the authority upon 
which the State relied: (a) heavily tracked another state’s controlling 
law and (b) misconstrued the basis for a Contract Clause claim.122 
The State had the burden of establishing the third prong, 
specifically that the career status repeal was reasonable and necessary 
 
teachers are underpaid relative to comparable positions and receive only minor raises 
during the first several years of teaching. Id. 
 114. Id. at 298–99, 776 S.E.2d at 12 (“We therefore conclude further that, as in 
Faulkenbury, Bailey, and Wiggs, the State has reaped benefits by using the Career Status 
Law as an inducement by which to attract and retain public school teachers in spite of the 
relatively low wages it pays them.”). 
 115. Id. at 301, 776 S.E.2d at 13. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 141, 500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (1998). 
 118. See Wiggs v. Edgecombe Cty., 361 N.C. 318, 319, 643 S.E.2d 904, 905 (2007). 
 119. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 301, 776 S.E.2d at 13. 
 120. Id. (citing Cherry v. Mayor of Balt., 762 F.3d 366, 369–74 (4th Cir. 2014)). 
 121. Id. at 301–02, 776 S.E.2d at 13–14. 
 122. Id. 
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for an important public purpose.123 While the state has some 
deference in determining what is reasonable and necessary,124 
complete deference would be inappropriate given that the state’s self-
interest is directly implicated.125 In this case, the State argued that the 
dismissal of ineffective teachers would improve the educational 
experience for all public school teachers and would further the North 
Carolina constitutional guarantee of a right to “the privilege of 
education.”126 According to the State, repealing career status would 
give local school boards more flexibility in managing their pool of 
available teachers and increase the quality of teachers within that 
pool.127 The court of appeals was unsympathetic to this argument,128 
finding ample ability to dismiss underperforming teachers during the 
probationary period and in the Career Status Law itself.129 
While the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that the repeal 
of career status for public school teachers “serve[d] no public purpose 
whatsoever,”130 the court was unpersuaded that even if it did advance 
a public purpose, the State did not carry its burden to demonstrate 
that the repeal was reasonable and necessary to forward that 
purpose.131 The court of appeals compared the reasonability and 
necessity of the repeal of teacher tenure with those of the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina’s prior cases, Faulkenbury v. Teachers’ and 
State Employees Retirement System132 and Bailey.133 In those prior 
cases, the state supreme court rejected the State’s arguments that the 
abrogation of contractual rights was reasonable and necessary even if 
the public purpose was legitimate.134 In addition to analyzing state 
 
 123. Id. at 302, 776 S.E.2d at 14. 
 124. See Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–13 
(1983) (“[C]ourts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and 
reasonableness of a particular measure.” (quoting U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 
U.S. 1, 23 (1977))). 
 125. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977). 
 126. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 302, 776 S.E.2d at 14 (quoting N.C. 
CONST. art. I, §	15). 
 127. Id. at 302–03, 776 S.E.2d at 14. 
 128. Id. at 303, 776 S.E.2d at 14–15. 
 129. See id. at 303, 776 S.E.2d at 14 (permitting school districts to dismiss career status 
teachers for “inadequate performance,” defined as “the failure to perform at a proficient 
level on any standard of the evaluation instrument” or “otherwise performing in a manner 
that is below standard” (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. §	115C-325(e)(1), (3) (2017))). 
 130. Id. at 304, 776 S.E.2d at 15. 
 131. Id. 
 132. 345 N.C. 683, 483 S.E.2d 422 (1997). 
 133. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 304, 776 S.E.2d at 15. 
 134. See Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 152, 500 S.E.2d 54, 66–67 (1998) (capping tax-
exempt retirement benefits); Faulkenbury, 345 N.C. at 693–94, 483 S.E.2d at 429 
(correcting the operation of the state pension plan). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018) 
2018] FAR FROM A “DEAD LETTER” 1699 
precedent, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in the instant case 
also found that: (a) less drastic alternatives were available to the state 
and (b) reforms to the teacher hiring and retention system could have 
been more targeted to the public purpose had it been necessary for 
local school boards to obtain greater flexibility in their hiring.135 
The court also examined the independent law of the land basis 
for the trial court’s determination. Inter alia, the State argued that it 
complied with the law of the land clause by articulating a legitimate 
government purpose and that the statute was rationally related to that 
purpose.136 Further, the State argued that the act of the state 
legislature should be given deference due to a presumption of 
constitutionality and that, even then, the argument should be settled 
in the legislature rather than the courts.137 
The appellate court largely dismissed the State’s cited case 
authority as “wholly misplaced” because the case upon which the 
State heavily relied did not involve a takings claim.138 Instead, the 
court of appeals focused on Bailey’s law of the land standard. The 
logic the court utilized was straightforward and focused on the 
similarities between the plaintiffs in Bailey and those in the present 
case: 
Here, as in Bailey, Plaintiffs contracted, as consideration for 
their employment, that after fulfilling the Career Status Law’s 
requirements, they would be entitled to career status 
protections. Here, as in Bailey, the Career Status Repeal 
purports to abrogate those protections and thus constitutes a 
taking of Plaintiffs’ private property. Here, as in Bailey, the 
Career Status Repeal offers no compensation for this taking. 
Thus, here, as in Bailey, the Career Status Repeal violates the 
Law of the Land Clause.139 
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the repeal of career 
status for public school teachers violated the state constitution’s law 
of the land provision in addition to the Contract Clause, finding each 
as a separate and independent basis for its decision.140 
 
 135. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 305, 776 S.E.2d at 15–16. 
 136. Id. at 306, 776 S.E.2d at 16–17. 
 137. Id. at 306–07, 776 S.E.2d at 17. 
 138. Id. at 307, 776 S.E.2d at 17. 
 139. Id. at 308, 776 S.E.2d at 17–18. 
 140. Id. at 308–09, 776 S.E.2d at 17–18. The State also lodged an argument alleging a 
violation of state civil procedure. The majority found this argument “without merit.” Id. at 
309–11, 776 S.E.2d at 18–19. 
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C. Court of Appeals’ Dissent 
The dissenting opinion, written by Judge Chris Dillon, concurred 
in part and dissented in part. Judge Dillon concurred with the 
majority that (a) probationary teachers who had not achieved career 
status lacked standing and (b) the career-status teachers had a 
constitutionally protected property interest in their continued public 
employment. For Judge Dillon, the law was unconstitutional to the 
extent that it allowed a school board to deprive a teacher of his or her 
property interest without a hearing.141 
Judge Dillon emphasized the deference given by the courts to 
acts of legislation, specifically the presumption of a statute’s 
constitutionality.142 With this presumption, Judge Dillon distinguished 
an individual teacher’s property right from a contractual right.143 He 
cited two United States Supreme Court cases from 1937 to support 
this distinction.144 In Judge Dillon’s reading, these cases established a 
rule that legislation is presumed not to create private contractual 
rights but, instead, to declare the policy of the state.145 
Judge Dillon relied heavily upon Phelps v. Board of Education146 
in rendering his decision.147 In that case, a New Jersey teacher tenure 
law prohibited a local school board from reducing teacher salaries or 
discharge without cause after three years of service.148 The Phelps 
Court found that the state law did not become a term of the contracts 
under which the public school teachers were employed.149 Instead, the 
state law limiting teacher tenure regulated the conduct of the local 
school board as an entity of the state.150 As characterized recently 
elsewhere, Phelps stands for the proposition that laws creating 
regulatory rights might not create contract rights subject to the 
 
 141. Id. at 319, 776 S.E.2d at 25 (Dillon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 142. Id. at 320, 776 S.E.2d at 25. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 320–21, 776 S.E.2d at 25 (first citing Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79 
(1937), then citing Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 323 (1937)). 
 145. Id. at 320–21, 776 S.E.2d at 25–26. 
 146. 300 U.S. 319 (1937). 
 147. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 321, 776 S.E.2 at 26 (Dillon, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 148. See Phelps, 300 U.S. at 323. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. (“Although the act of 1909 prohibited the board, a creature of the state, from 
reducing the teacher’s salary or discharging him without cause, we agree with the courts 
below that this was but a regulation of the conduct of the board and not a term of a 
continuing contract of indefinite duration with the individual teacher.”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018) 
2018] FAR FROM A “DEAD LETTER” 1701 
Contract Clause.151 Applying the Phelps holding to the North 
Carolina law, Judge Dillon suggested Phelps would control the 
determination and that the Career Status Law created a legislative 
status, not a private contractual right, for teachers.152 In support of his 
conclusion, Judge Dillon cited the supreme courts of nine other states 
that held that tenure for public employees did not create a 
constitutionally protected contract right.153 
It is necessary to mention three pertinent details about the 
Phelps decision. First, as the majority opinion noted,154 the Phelps 
decision and the other 1937 case upon which the dissent is predicated 
were not cited by any of the parties before the court at any point 
during the litigation.155 Accordingly, the majority considered these 
arguments abandoned. Second, the Phelps decision—while not 
overruled—was decided prior to United States Trust Co. in 1977. 
While it is unclear whether the Phelps decision would play out the 
same way if heard after 1977, it should also be noted that the court 
distinguished Phelps in a subsequent teacher tenure case in 1938’s 
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, upholding an Indiana tenure law.156 
In applying Phelps, courts have examined, as a threshold question, 
whether contractual rights were created.157 A more nuanced analysis 
could have laid out why Phelps applied but Brand did not. Third, the 
 
 151. See Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Sch., 876 F.3d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 
2017) (“Statutes typically create regulatory rights not subject to the Contract Clause. But 
when a legislature uses contractual language that induces public reliance, it can create an 
enforceable contract .	.	.	.” (citing Phelps, 300 U.S. at 323)). 
 152. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 321, 776 S.E.2d at 26 (Dillon, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 153. Id. at 321–22, 776 S.E.2d at 26 (citing Proska v. Ariz. State Sch. for the Deaf & 
Blind, 74 P.3d 939, 943–44 (Ariz. 2003); Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 808–10 (Conn. 
1985); Crawford v. Sadler, 34 So.2d 38, 39 (Fla. 1948); Fumarolo v. Bd. of Educ., 566 
N.E.2d 1283, 1306 (Ill. 1990); Munsch v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 3 So.2d 622, 624–25 (La. 1941); 
Lapolla v. Bd. of Educ., 26 N.E.2d 807, 807 (N.Y. 1940); Malone v. Hayden, 197 A. 344, 
352–53 (Pa. 1938); Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., AFL-CIO v. State, 682 P.2d 869, 872 
(Wash. 1984); Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 297 N.W. 383, 386 (Wis. 1941)). 
 154. See id. at 312, 776 S.E.2d at 20 (majority opinion). 
 155. Id. In a footnote, Judge Dillon provided a defense for his sua sponte reliance on 
Phelps and Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74 (1937), noting that neither case was cited in 
the litigation. Id. at 321 n.2, 776 S.E.2d at 26 n.2 (Dillon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“The majority is troubled by my reliance on Phelps and Dodge since 
these cases were not cited or argued by the State. However, the State does argue that the 
Repeal does not violate the Contract Clause, and I believe it is appropriate for this Court 
to rely on Supreme Court opinions and other legal authority which may be controlling or 
relevant in determining the law on a constitutional issue raised by a party.”). 
 156. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 107 (1938). 
 157. See, e.g., Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Madison Consol. Sch., 876 F.3d 926, 932 (7th 
Cir. 2017). The Elliott court noted that legislatures that craft tenure laws that “induce[] 
public reliance” can create an enforceable contract subject to the Contract Clause. Id. 
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Phelps Court deferred to the courts of individual states about the 
determination of contractual rights.158 While Judge Dillon cited that 
the supreme courts of other states have ruled against contractual 
rights for public school teachers, the majority could not find a North 
Carolina teacher tenure case that involved vested contractual rights 
that implicated the law of the land clause or the Contract Clause.159 
Judge Dillon’s dissent also distinguished teacher tenure rights 
from deferred compensation arrangements, such as those in Wiggs 
and Faulkenbury.160 Teacher tenure is not “earned” in the same way 
as deferred compensation, according to Judge Dillon but instead the 
eligibility for the status is provided after four years of service.161 Even 
then, the career status is not automatic but must be granted by the 
local school board, unlike a pension plan or deferred compensation 
arrangement. Judge Dillon pointed to state cases in Washington and 
California that purportedly support treating tenure rights differently 
than deferred compensation.162 
Judge Dillon’s dissent did not explicitly mention the state’s law 
of the land clause but instead focused exclusively on the federal 
Contract Clause. As a result, Judge Dillon’s opinion addressed only 
one of the two grounds that Judge Hobgood had found in declaring 
the law unconstitutional. While the court of appeals does apply a de 
novo standard of review for orders of summary judgment,163 Judge 
Dillon excluded from his reasoning a separate and independent 
ground for the trial court’s determination. 
D. State Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina decided the NCAE case 
in April 2016.164 At the time of the opinion, the court was facing a 
critical and unusual election in November 2016. The court has seven 
 
 158. Phelps v. Bd. of Educ., 300 U.S. 319, 322 (1937) (“[W]here a statute is claimed to 
create a contractual right we give weight to the construction of the statute by the courts of 
the state.”). 
 159. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 241 N.C. App. at 314, 776 S.E.2d at 21. 
 160. See id. at 324, 776 S.E.2d at 27–28 (Dillon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 161. See id. at 324, 776 S.E.2d at 28. 
 162. Id. (citing Washington Fed’n of State Emps., AFL-CIO v. State, 682 P.2d 869, 872 
(Wash. 1984) and Kern v. City of Long Beach, 179 P.2d 799, 801–03 (Cal. 1947)). 
 163. N.C. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 
572, 576 (2008) (“Our standard of review of an appeal from summary judgment is de 
novo.”). 
 164. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 777, 786 S.E.2d 255, 255 (2016). 
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seats, which are all technically non-partisan.165 Even so, judicial 
candidates’ party affiliations are known, party endorsements are 
solicited, and political ideologies loom large in this politically diverse 
state. 
At the time of the NCAE opinion, the court was composed of 
four Republican members, including Chief Justice Mark Martin.166 
Democrats occupied the three remaining seats on the court.167 If a 
vote had split solely along party lines, the Republican members of the 
court would have prevailed. 
In November 2016, Justice Robert Edmunds, a Republican, was 
facing reelection.168 In the run-up to the election, the state legislature 
changed the state’s supreme court election laws from a contested 
process to one where Edmunds would run for “retention.”169 This 
retention election would be an up-or-down vote on whether to keep 
Justice Edmunds rather than a contested process against other 
candidates. When the retention bill was found unconstitutional, 
Justice Edmunds faced a challenger for his seat on the court, and he 
ultimately lost the seat to Democrat Mike Morgan.170 
The conservative political composition of the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina at the time made it plausible that the NCAE court 
would return a narrowly tailored verdict upholding the repeal of 
teacher tenure based on the arguments of Judge Dillon’s dissent. That 
said, such a ruling likely would have created a rift in the case law 
between the precedent in Wiggs, Faulkenbury, and Bailey. The 
Supreme Court of North Carolina would have needed to deftly 
distinguish NCAE, the teacher tenure case, from its past precedent or 
potentially overturn its prior rulings in order to reach a reversal.171 
 
 165. Supreme Court of North Carolina, N.C. CT. SYS., http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/
Appellate/Supreme/ [https://perma.cc/XP3A-Y6HG]. 
 166. Mark D. Martin, N.C. CT. SYS., https://appellate.nccourts.org/Bios/index.php?c
=1&Name=Martin [https://perma.cc/RYR6-SF2Y]. 
 167. See Gary Robertson, Morgan Victory Returns Democratic Majority to NC 
Supreme Court, ASHEVILLE CITIZEN TIMES (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.citizen-
times.com/story/news/2016/11/24/morgan-victory-returns-democratic-majority-nc-
supreme-court/94386322/ [https://perma.cc/A3VN-KCSN]. 
 168. Frank Stasio & Laura Pellicer, Bob Edmunds Vies to Maintain Seat in NC 
Supreme Court Election, WUNC (Oct. 18, 2016), http://wunc.org/post/bob-edmunds-vies-
maintain-seat-nc-supreme-court-election#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/PGH9-TS46]. 
 169. See Anne Blythe, NC Supreme Court Retention Election Law to be Overturned, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-
government/state-politics/article61148607.html [https://perma.cc/5TLT-6BFH]. 
 170. See Robertson, supra note 167. 
 171. Cf. FUN, Some Nights, on SOME NIGHTS (ATLANTIC 2012) (describing a search 
for meaning amid apparent contradictions, asking “Oh, Lord, I’m still not sure what I 
stand for. What do I stand for?”). 
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It is within this context that the court’s unanimous opinion, as 
authored by Justice Edmunds, affirmed the trial court’s opinion that 
the career status repeal was unconstitutional on Contract Clause 
grounds.172 The court did not reach a decision on the law of the land 
claim, finding that the Contract Clause grounds were sufficient.173 Put 
differently, the state’s supreme court decided the case in such a way 
that it was not solely based on the law of North Carolina but on that 
of the United States. In doing so, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina increased the likelihood that other courts across the country 
could find its reasoning persuasive when deciding similar cases. 
Relatedly, in retelling the case’s procedural posture, the NCAE 
court subtly recast the court of appeals’ decision on the law of the 
land clause. Concerning the court of appeals’ majority opinion, the 
court wrote: 
The majority concluded that the trial court correctly found the 
repeal of the Career Status Law violated the United States 
Constitution’s Contract Clause as to teachers who had already 
earned career status at the time of repeal. Based on this 
Contract Clause violation, the Court of Appeals further held 
that plaintiffs’ contract right was a property interest that was 
being unjustly taken away by the repeal without compensation 
to plaintiffs, in violation of the Law of the Land Clause of the 
North Carolina Constitution.174 
A casual glance would miss the important distinction. The court 
of appeals did not base its determination on a violation of the 
Contract Clause alone. Applying Bailey, the court of appeals found 
that the vested contractual right of teachers also represented a 
property right, “the uncompensated impairment of which by 
subsequent legislation can constitute a taking in violation of the Law 
of the Land Clause.”175 While the characterization of the court of 
appeals’ decision is not incorrect, it is misleading insofar as it did not 
reflect both the trial court’s and the appellate court’s intention that 
the law of the land clause violation was a separate and independent 
 
 172. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 792–93, 786 S.E.2d. 255, 266 
(2016). 
 173. Id. at 792, 786 S.E.2d at 266 (“Because we hold the repeal is unconstitutional in its 
retroactive application based on the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, we 
need not address plaintiffs’ alternative claim based on Article I, Section 19 of the North 
Carolina Constitution.”). 
 174. Id. at 785, 786 S.E.2d at 262 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 175. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 241 N.C. App. 284, 307, 776 S.E.2d 1, 17 (2015) 
(citing Bailey v. State, 348 N.C. 130, 154–55, 500 S.E.2d 54, 68–69 (1998)). 
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ground for their decisions. The trial and appellate courts had 
conducted both the Contract Clause analysis, as well as a due process-
based analysis based on taking property without just compensation. 
Applying the United States Trust Co. three-pronged test, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether a contractual 
obligation arose from the repealed Career Status Law. The NCAE 
court cited Phelps and Dodge, among other cases, to support the 
court’s deep reluctance to find a contract created by statute without 
compelling supporting evidence.176 
At first, the court seemed highly sympathetic to Judge Dillon’s 
dissent. It sidestepped the fact that Judge Dillon arrived at the 
citations to Phelps and Dodge sua sponte, and it emphasized the 
presumption that state laws are constitutional.177 The state supreme 
court went so far as to distinguish the case from both Bailey 
(concerning retirement benefits) and Faulkenbury (concerning 
disability retirement payments), in which the statutes themselves 
created the vested career status and featured benefits that had been 
earned by service over time.178 By contrast, the public school teachers 
in the instant case did not have “vested career status rights at the end 
of the probationary period.”179 This may have come as a surprise to 
the teachers themselves, who looked to the Career Status Law as 
their pathway to tenure. Not so, according to the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina. Instead of granting tenure to the teachers, the Career 
Status Law was 
a regulation of conduct through which local school boards can 
exercise their discretion to enter into contracts with teachers for 
whom they approve career status. The Career Status Law 
contemplates the creation of individual contracts between school 
boards and teachers but does not itself establish any benefit 
provided to teachers by the State nor create any relationship 
between them.180 
 
 176. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 786–87, 786 S.E.2d at 262–63 (“Construing a 
statute to create contractual rights in the absence of an expression of unequivocal intent 
would be at best ill-advised, binding the hands of future sessions of the legislature and 
obstructing or preventing subsequent revisions and repeals.”). 
 177. See id. at 785–86, 786 S.E.2d at 262 (“This Court presumes that statutes passed by 
the General Assembly are constitutional, and duly passed acts will not be struck down 
unless found unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.” (citations omitted)). 
 178. Id. at 788, 786 S.E.2d at 263–64. 
 179. Id. at 788, 786 S.E.2d at 264. 
 180. Id. (emphasis added). 
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In a clever way, the state supreme court threaded a needle: using 
the arguments of Judge Dillon’s dissent, the court nonetheless upheld 
the teacher tenure structure. The court concluded that the Career 
Status Law did not, in itself, create a vested contractual right but 
instead created the framework from which teachers and individual 
school boards formed contracts that granted teachers vested rights.181 
When those contracts were created, according to the court, the state 
legislature “no longer could take away that vested right retroactively 
in a way that would substantially impair it.”182 
Using both contract law theory and the evidentiary record, the 
state supreme court found that the teacher-plaintiffs relied upon the 
promise of the career status protections in making their contracts with 
their school boards.183 Moreover, the court found that the Career 
Status Law did not grant vested contractual rights by itself but was 
instead an implied term in the contracts between the teachers and the 
school boards upon which the teachers relied.184 
Finding that the teachers had contractual rights, the NCAE court 
then inquired whether there was a substantial impairment of these 
rights.185 Finding that the rights “boiled down to enhanced job 
security,” the state supreme court held that the changes were a 
substantial impairment of these promised protections, including the 
promise of continuing employment and the right to a hearing.186 
Following the third prong of United States Trust Co., the court 
next turned to whether the substantial impairment of the contractual 
right was a reasonable and necessary means of achieving a legitimate 
public purpose.187 While the court noted that the burden was on the 
State to justify an otherwise unconstitutional impairment of contract, 
the NCAE court did note that “[t]he Contract Clause is not meant to 
bind the hands of the [s]tate absolutely.”188 Here again, the court 
captured the spirit of Judge Dillon’s dissent but ultimately sided with 
the teachers. 
The State articulated its public policy goal as culling “‘adequate’ 
but marginal teachers with career status” as part of an overall effort 
 
 181. Id. at 789, 786 S.E.2d at 264. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 789–90, 786 S.E.2d at 264. 
 184. Id. at 789, 786 S.E.2d at 264. 
 185. Id. at 790, 786 S.E.2d at 265 (“We next move to the second part of a Contract 
Clause analysis in which we consider whether the vested rights found above were 
substantially impaired.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 265. 
 188. Id. 
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to improve public instruction in the state.189 The NCAE court found 
that “no evidence indicate[d] that such a problem existed.”190 Instead, 
the evidentiary record and the statute itself demonstrated that 
“inadequate performance” provided sufficient grounds for dismissal 
even under the Career Status Law.191 Under the United States Trust 
Co. test, a state must have a legitimate purpose for the challenged 
action. Here, the court was skeptical of the adequacy of the state’s 
purpose. 
Even if the dismissal of “adequate” teachers had been a 
legitimate public purpose, however, the means for doing so must also 
be necessary and reasonable under the United States Trust Co. test.192 
Referring back to its review of statutory changes in career status for 
teachers from 1971 to 2013, the state supreme court found that the 
state had considerable alternatives that would be “less sweeping” 
than a complete revocation of teacher tenure.193 Accordingly, the 
court found that the State failed to meet its burden in demonstrating 
why the retroactive repeal of tenure was necessary and reasonable.194 
While the court found the repeal unconstitutional on Contract 
Clause grounds, it did not address the law of the land claims.195 This 
raises both concern and opportunity. The state supreme court’s action 
may signal to lower courts that it is acceptable to sever Bailey’s 
Contract Clause finding from that of its law of the land holding and 
simply rule on one ground rather than two separate and independent 
grounds. The diminishment of the law of the land clause from a 
separate independent ground in the lower courts to a footnote in the 
state supreme court might lead some courts faced with similar 
circumstances to conclude that (a) ruling on two grounds is 
duplicating effort and would not promote judicial efficiency, and (b) if 
one ground is sufficient, then it should be the federal constitutional 
ground of the Contract Clause rather than the law of the land’s 
takings analysis under Bailey and its progeny. 
 
 189. Id. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 266. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 792, 786 S.E.2d at 266; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §	115C-325(e)(1), (3) 
(2017). 
 192. N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 791, 786 S.E.2d at 265. 
 193. Id. at 792, 786 S.E.2d at 266. 
 194. Id. 
 195. The court noted that ruling on the law of the land clause was unnecessary as the 
Contract Clause was sufficient grounds in itself. Id. 
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III.  BACKGROUND ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW GENERALLY 
Public employees do not simply obtain a job from their 
government employer; they may also obtain a constitutionally 
protected interest in their property and liberty.196 In arguing for the 
professionalization of the administration of public programs, into the 
field we now know as public administration, Woodrow Wilson noted 
that one of the goals of this new field was to make the business of 
government “less unbusinesslike.”197 Wilson regarded public 
administration as a field of business, noting that “a body of 
thoroughly trained officials” was a “plain business necessity.”198 
Scholar Graham Allison once wrote that private and public 
management are “at least as different as they are similar, and that the 
differences are at least as important as the similarities.”199 One salient 
difference between the public and private sectors is the management 
of personnel. Allison noted that private-sector managers had greater 
latitude and more authority to direct personnel.200 Conversely, Allison 
noted that the public-sector managers often “found the civil service 
system a much larger constraint on his actions and demand on his 
time than he had anticipated.”201 
Relevant to the issues presented in NCAE v. State, public-sector 
employees can acquire a constitutionally protected right to their 
continued public employment; public employees do not simply obtain 
a job from their government employer, they may also obtain 
constitutionally protected interest in their property and liberty.202 In 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,203 among other cases, 
the Supreme Court found that civil servants have constitutional 
 
 196. See Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional Relevance of the Employer-Sovereign 
Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of Government Employees in Light of the 
Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 797, 797 (2007); see also MARTI 
HOUSER, LISA SALKOVITZ KOHN & GEORGE S. CRISICI, AM. BAR ASS’N, INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT §	III (2008), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2008/ac2008/143.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J3TT-M3GZ]. 
 197. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 201 (1887). 
 198. Id. at 216. 
 199. Graham T. Allison, Public and Private Administrative Leadership: Are They 
Fundamentally Alike in All Unimportant Aspects?, in LEADERSHIP AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 214, 234 (Thomas J. Sergiovanni & John E. Corbally eds., 1984). 
 200. Id. at 221. 
 201. Id. at 232. While Allison’s comparison of the public and private manager is now 
several decades old, it continues to provide insight on impressionistic differences between 
the management of personnel in the public and private spheres. 
 202. See Garry, supra note 196, at 799; see also HOUSER ET AL., supra note 196, §	III.  
 203. 470 U.S. 532 (1985). 
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protections in their jobs that necessitate due process procedures.204 In 
effect, by taking away a civil servant’s job, an employment matter can 
become a takings case. As noted by the Loudermill Court, the 
substantial interest in public employees retaining their jobs 
outweighed the interest of the state in removing them from their 
positions quickly.205 
Public school teachers, in particular, are now facing a wave of 
challenges across the country to their vested employment protections. 
Proposals limiting teacher tenure have been debated in eighteen 
states, with two states—Florida and North Carolina—passing laws 
that eliminate teacher tenure entirely.206 With over three million 
public school teachers nationwide, the ongoing issues facing teachers 
in one state can influence what may occur in other states. 
Recently, in Vergara v. State,207 a California intermediate 
appellate court upheld the state’s teacher tenure law, which provided 
tenure to teachers after two years.208 A group of students lodged an 
equal protection challenge to the statute.209 Their complaint alleged 
that teacher tenure allowed “grossly ineffective” teachers to become 
employed and maintain their employment in school systems, 
especially disproportionally within those schools affecting students in 
minority and economically disadvantaged communities210 The state 
appellate court reversed the trial court’s repeal of the statute,211 
finding that the students had failed to prove that they were more 
likely to be taught by ineffective teachers than any other group of 
students.212 The California Supreme Court denied review, letting the 
intermediate appellate court’s ruling stand.213 
The California appellate court limited its Vergara decision to the 
“particular constitutional challenge that plaintiffs decided to bring,” 
namely, the rights of students under equal protection theory. This 
narrow ruling suggests that other constitutional grounds could have 
 
 204. Id. at 542. 
 205. Id. at 544. 
 206. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Tenure: How Due Process Protects Teachers and 
Students, AM. EDUCATOR, Summer 2015, at 4, https://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/ae_
summer2015_kahlenberg.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZA2-U5KZ]. 
 207. 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 208. Id. at 557–58. 
 209. Id. at 538. 
 210. Id. at 539. 
 211. Id. at 557–58. 
 212. Id. at 538. 
 213. Id. at 558. 
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led to a different judicial outcome.214 In April 2016, the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina decided such a case: NCAE v. State. 
Instead of focusing on the rights of students, NCAE v. State 
concerned the constitutional rights of teachers.215 Specifically, in 2013, 
the North Carolina General Assembly acted to rescind career status 
for public school teachers.216 In a separate action, the General 
Assembly also enabled county governments to decide whether to 
eliminate career status for local tenured employees.217 Previously, 
public school teachers and certain public employees could obtain 
career status after completing a probationary period.218 Career status 
granted government employees certain protections, including 
dismissal for cause and due process rights.  
IV.  BACKGROUND ON PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW IN NORTH 
CAROLINA 
As in the vast majority of states, the default employment status 
in North Carolina for most workers is “at-will” employment.219 Under 
North Carolina law, employment is “terminable at the will of either 
party irrespective of the quality of performance by the other party” 
unless something else (i.e., a contract) evinces something other than 
an at-will relationship.220 In North Carolina, “unless something ‘else’ 
 
 214. See id. at 557 (noting that a higher number of grossly ineffective teachers “may 
not present a problem with policy, but it does not, in itself, give rise to an equal protection 
violation”). 
 215. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 786, 786 S.E.2d 255, 262 (2016). 
 216. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriation Act, ch. 360, sec. 
9.6(a), §	115C-325, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1091 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	115C-
325 (2013)). 
 217. Act of June 29, 2012, ch. 126, sec. 1, §	153A-77(d), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 416, 419 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	153A-77(d) (2017)). 
 218. An Act to Establish an Orderly System of Employment and Dismissal of Public 
School Personnel, ch. 883, sec. 1, §	115-142(c), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1396, 1396 (repealed 
2013). 
 219. See Diane M. Juffras, Public Employment Law, in COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL 
GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA, art. 19, at 2 (2007) (“When a North Carolina 
employer hires someone, the legal presumption that governs the working relationship is 
that the employment is ‘at will.’”); The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, 
NAT’L COUNCIL OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-
employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z5VW-5JG7]. 
 220. Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1971). See generally Robert 
Joyce, “Employment at Will” vs. “Right to Work”, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. 
(Jan. 8, 2013), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=6957 [https://perma.cc/X9S4-SA43] (providing 
an overview of at-will employment in North Carolina). 
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protects the employee, his or her status is ‘at will.’”221 At-will 
employment status enables employers to dismiss an employee at any 
time for any reason, or for no reason, unless there is a specific law 
against doing so.222 Under many at-will employment laws, employers 
may also alter their employees’ wages, work schedules, benefits, or 
paid time off without legal penalty.223 Employees in an at-will 
relationship may also terminate their employment at their own 
discretion without legal liability.224 
While at-will employment is the default, it may be modified by 
contract. For example, employees may have an employment contract 
with their employer promising that employees may only be 
terminated for “just cause.”225 If the employment status is modified 
via employment contract, then the employee can move from at-will to 
protected employment. 
Public employees in North Carolina may also have particular 
protections that affect whether they are employed at-will.226 Under 
federal jurisprudence, when a public employer grants a public 
employee a “legitimate claim of entitlement” to continued 
employment, it has created a property interest in that employee’s 
“continued [public] employment.”227 Moving a public employee from 
at-will to just cause, or similar protections, can create such a property 
interest.228 
The creation of the property interest in continued public 
employment triggers constitutional due process protections. Under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, due process is owed when 
governments deprive citizens of property.229 Protected public 
employees have three distinct due process requirements: (a) notice to 
the employee, (b) an opportunity for the employee to respond, and 
(c) a final decision by an impartial decision maker.230 These due 
process protections can create additional procedural requirements for 
 
 221. Joyce, supra note 220. The four methods discussed in this section, including local 
ordinance and employment contracts, can provide this “something else” to create a non-
at-will employment relationship in North Carolina. 
 222. The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, supra note 219.  
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See id.  
 226. See Joyce, supra note 220. 
 227. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 228. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985); Howell v. 
Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1992). 
 229. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541. 
 230. Id. at 546; see also Crump v. Bd. of Educ., 326 N.C. 603, 615, 392 S.E.2d 579, 585 
(1990) (noting the necessity of an impartial decision maker). 
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employers looking to dismiss or discipline protected public employees 
compared with those employed at will. 
Until recently, North Carolina had at least four methods of 
moving public employees from at-will to a protected status: (1) 
employment contract; (2) local ordinance; (3) “career status” for 
teachers, otherwise known as teacher tenure; and (4) the State 
Human Resources Act (“SHRA”). Any of these four methods may 
trigger due process protections for public employees in North 
Carolina. 
A. Employment Contract 
At-will employment is the default employment status in North 
Carolina.231 A public employer could arrange an employment contract 
with a government employee that promised additional protections 
beyond the at-will default. In doing so, the protections afforded by 
the contract would govern the employment relationship rather than 
the default at-will rule. 
B. Local Government Ordinance 
The North Carolina legislature has delegated broad authority for 
human resources management to the city and county governments.232 
Accordingly, city councils or county commissioners may enact an 
ordinance giving employees just cause protections.233 If a local 
governmental body so chooses, an employee who passes a 
probationary period may only be dismissed if the employer can show 
good cause. 
The method by which a city council or county commission adopts 
these protections has important legal ramifications. In North 
Carolina, only an ordinance can create a “legitimate claim of 
entitlement” to employment, and, therefore, a property interest in the 
job requiring due process before dismissal.234 Other methods, such as 
inclusion in a personnel manual, are insufficient to create such a legal 
protection.235 
 
 231. Juffras, supra note 219, at 2.  
 232. Id. 
 233. See Joyce, supra note 220.  
 234. Howell v. Town of Carolina Beach, 106 N.C. App. 410, 417, 417 S.E.2d 277, 281 
(1992). 
 235. See Kearney v. Cty. of Durham, 99 N.C. App. 349, 351–52, 393 S.E.2d 129, 130 
(1990).  
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C. Teacher Tenure—Public School Teachers 
Beginning in 1971, the North Carolina legislature provided all 
public school teachers particular protections regarding the terms of 
their dismissal and enumerated the specific reasons for which they 
could be terminated.236 After completing a probationary period of 
four years, teachers could be granted career status after a vote of the 
local school board.237 Upon achieving career status, a teacher could be 
dismissed or demoted only for one of the fifteen enumerated 
reasons.238 Teachers with such status were also granted procedural 
notice and hearing rights.239 
In 2013, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the 
Career Status Law.240 Inter alia, the new law largely barred any new 
candidate from obtaining career status as of August 1, 2013.241 As of 
July 1, 2018, the law would revoke the career status of all teachers 
who had previously earned the protections associated with teacher 
tenure.242 This new system is best described as at-will employment, 
given that the renewal decision for each teacher would be at the 
discretion of the school board.243 
Within months of the repeal of the Career Status Law, the North 
Carolina Association of Educators and six public school teachers filed 
suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The North Carolina 
Association of Educators lobbies on behalf of North Carolina public 
school teachers and employees in matters of public policy in the state 
legislature.244 The question before the state supreme court was 
 
 236. An Act to Establish an Orderly System of Employment and Dismissal of Public 
School Personnel, ch. 883, sec. 1, §	115-142(c), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1396, 1397–98 
(repealed 2013). 
 237. An Act to Modify the Hearing Process Applicable to Probationary Teachers, ch. 
326, sec. 1, §	115C-325(c)(1), 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 528, 528 (repealed 2013). 
 238. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	115C-325(e)(1) (2017). 
 239. An Act to Establish an Orderly System of Employment and Dismissal of Public 
School Personnel, sec. 1, §	115-142(c), 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1399–1402. 
 240. Current Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriation Act of 2013, ch. 
360, sec. 9.6(a), §	115C-325, 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 995, 1091 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§	115C-325 (2017)) (“‘Career employee’ as used in this section means an employee who 
was awarded career status with that local board as a teacher prior to August 1, 2013.”). 
 241. Id. sec. 9.6(f). 
 242. Id. sec. 9.6(b), (j). 
 243. Id. sec. 9.6 (b), (g). 
 244. See Will Doran, Is North Carolina’s Biggest Teachers’ Lobby Breaking the Law, or 
Being Targeted?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh Nov. 24, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columns-blogs/under-the-
dome/article186136258.html [https://perma.cc/2XEH-4CUB]; Who We Are, N.C. ASS’N OF 
EDUCATORS, http://www.ncae.org/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/PE33-VQHS]; see also 
Setting the Record Straight, N.C. ASS’N OF EDUCATORS, http://www.ncae.org/setting-the-
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whether a state law could remove the career status protections for 
current public employees.245 
D. The State Human Resources Act & Recent Changes for County 
Health Officials 
Most county employees are subject to county employment 
procedures and are employed under an at-will status.246 Broadly 
speaking, these employees may be dismissed, disciplined, or demoted 
without just cause. 
The SHRA defines the recruitment, selection, and termination of 
four county-level functions: public health, mental health, social 
services, and emergency management.247 In 1975, the SHRA (then 
titled the State Personnel Act) was amended to change the 
employment status of employees within the Act’s coverage.248 With 
this amendment, career employees under the SHRA were given just 
cause protections against discipline and dismissal.249 
The just cause protection created a property interest in 
continued public employment for career employees at the state and 
local levels.250 This property interest necessitated due process for 
career employees subject to disciplinary proceedings. This protection 
continues to extend to state and local career employees subject to the 
Act.251 As a general rule, public employees in county health and social 
service departments are employed at the county level but are subject 
 
record-straight/ [https://perma.cc/SC9H-62U6] (“The NCAE is not a union, as it does not 
have bargaining rights. North Carolina is a non-union state.”). 
 245. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 778–79, 786 S.E.2d 255, 257–58 
(2016). 
 246. Juffras, supra note 219, at 2. (“For most city and county employees, there is a 
presumption of employment at will, unless the employee proves otherwise.”). 
 247. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	126-5(a)(2) (2017). The 1965 version of the State Personnel 
Act included employees of local social service, public health, mental health, and civil 
defense agencies that received federal funds. State Personnel Act, ch. 640, §	2, 1965 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 708, 710 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	126-5(a)(2) (2017)). 
 248. Act of June 18, 1975, ch. 667, §§	8–10, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 809, 810–12 (codified 
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	126-35(a) (2017)). 
 249. Id. §	10. 
 250. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1985) 
(establishing the standard for a public employee’s property interest in continued public 
employment). 
 251. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	126-35(a) (2017) (“No career State employee subject to the 
North Carolina Human Resources Act shall be discharged, suspended, or demoted for 
disciplinary reasons, except for just cause.”). 
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to the SHRA and, therefore, may receive career status protections as 
tenured employees.252 
Once career status employees pass a certain probationary period, 
they are subject to the SHRA and its guarantee of just cause dismissal 
and due process protections.253 As such, employers must have cause to 
terminate their employment or demote them. In addition, career 
employees are afforded grievance procedures and impartial review 
through an administrative process in Raleigh, the state capital.254 
Under a recent legislative act, Session Law 2012-126, county 
governments around the state may now opt out of SHRA protections 
by choosing to consolidate their human services functions into a new 
agency.255 In other words, two or more county agencies could be 
combined into a new “consolidated human services agency.”256 While 
the law creates a complex array of detailed processes and exceptions, 
Session Law 2012-126 enables county commissioners to shut down 
one or more county agency entities and create a new agency. 
The 2012 law does not provide definitions for certain relevant 
terms, and that omission can cause substantial uncertainty. For 
example, the term “Human Services” is not defined within the law. 
The broad umbrella term “Human Services” could mean that county 
leaders might decide to fold a diverse array of previously distinct 
function areas into a new consolidated agency. It is understood to 
incorporate county public health and social services agencies, but it 
may also include other types of services provided by a county, such as 
aging, veterans affairs, or transportation.257 Similarly, “consolidated” 
and “consolidated human service agency” are also undefined within 
the 2012 law.258 
 
 252. Aimee Wall, An Update on Recent Changes for Local Human Services Agencies, 
COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Apr. 23, 2013), http://canons.sog.unc.edu/?p=
7090 [https://perma.cc/54F9-AXRD]. 
 253. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	126-1.1, -35(a) (2017) (“No career State employee subject to 
the North Carolina Human Resources Act shall be discharged, suspended, or demoted for 
disciplinary reasons, except for just cause.”). 
 254. Id. §	126-35(a). 
 255. Act of June 29, 2012, ch. 126, sec. 1, §	153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 416, 419 
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §	153A-77(d) (2017)). 
 256. See Wall, supra note 252. 
 257. According to Wall, local governments have three options to choose from under 
the 2012 law. Id. If management chooses one of the two specific options allowing for 
consolidation, they are explicitly barred from consolidating certain local management 
entities. Id. For example, local management entities that handle mental health, substance 
abuse, and developmental disabilities generally cannot be incorporated into a consolidated 
human services agency. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	153A-76 (2017). 
 258. See Wall, supra note 252. 
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County consolidation of local government entities can strip 
career status employees of their protected status. In many cases, the 
consolidation will eliminate one or more current local government 
entities. If counties elect to consolidate, under certain procedures,259 
the county may close an agency in which the county employees 
previously fell under the SHRA’s ambit. Under Session Law 2012-
126, the employees of the new consolidated human services agency 
are not subject to the SHRA unless the county commissioners 
explicitly elect to have the SHRA extend to the newly created 
agency.260 By creating a new consolidated agency out of two or more 
local government agencies, state law dictates that the employees of 
the new consolidated agency are not subject to the SHRA.261 The 
newly consolidated agency employees would be subject to the SHRA 
if, and only if, county commissioners expressly elect to keep the 
employees under the SHRA.262 Career status employees of these 
now-defunct county agencies, previously covered under the SHRA, 
might be moved into these new consolidated agencies and lose their 
protected status when they are rehired as employees of a new agency 
or not rehired at all. Put simply, state law enables counties to lift 
certain workers from SHRA career status protections by transitioning 
them into a new consolidated agency wherein they would not have 
those protections. 
One out of every three counties in North Carolina has 
consolidated its county departments, including some of its most 
populous counties such as Wake, Buncombe, Guilford, and 
Mecklenburg.263 More counties are considering consolidation. 
The legal repercussions of moving a local career employee into a 
consolidated human services agency subject to at-will human 
resources management remain unclear. Doing so may create legal risk 
for county governments, particularly after the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina’s decision in NCAE v. State, which upheld career 
status protections for teachers who had obtained the protected 
 
 259. Id.  
 260. Act of June 29, 2012, sec. 1, §	153A-77(d), 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 419; see also 
Wall, supra note 252. 
 261. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	153A-77(a) (2017); see also Wall, supra note 252. 
 262. §	153A-77(d). 
 263. Jill D. Moore & Aimee N. Wall, PH and SS Organization and Governance: 
Resolutions as of April 2018, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T, https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.
sog.unc.edu/files/CHSA%20map%2004.2018%20v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTT5-8XA3]. 
Notably, these counties include Raleigh, Asheville, Greensboro, and Charlotte, 
respectively. 
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status.264 Just as the NCAE litigation could be applied to public school 
teachers in other states, the case may also be applicable to this 
separate group of public employees in the newly consolidated health 
departments. 
V.  ON THE APPLICATION OF NCAE V. STATE IN NORTH CAROLINA 
AND ELSEWHERE 
Rather than fashion a holding based on state law principles, the 
NCAE court hung its holding on the Contract Clause alone.265 In 
doing so, the court increased the likelihood that other courts across 
the country may find its reasoning persuasive when deciding similar 
cases. 
A. Applying the Lessons of NCAE in North Carolina 
In North Carolina, another group of public employees, namely 
those affected by statutory changes to the SHRA, seem similarly 
situated to the public school teachers in the NCAE litigation. Certain 
public employees who were previously protected by North Carolina’s 
SHRA may lose their protected status after a recent change to state 
law. This law enables counties to consolidate their human services 
functions into a new agency.266 After this new agency is created, 
public employees who had previously obtained career status under 
the SHRA could lose that status. In both cases, state law allowed 
them to obtain particular employment protections, which once 
achieved would remove them from at-will employment status. Recent 
state action has had the effect of removing these protections. 
Even with the similarities between the two groups of public 
employees, four important distinctions remain: (1) the statutory 
regime providing the career status; (2) the method by which career 
status is removed; (3) whether the career status employee has been 
rehired; and (4) the diversity of public employees affected. 
 
 264. N.C. Ass’n of Educators v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 792–93, 786 S.E.2d 255, 266 (2016). 
 265. Id. 
 266. N.C. GEN. STAT. §	153A-77(b)–(d) (2017). Before the legislation was enacted, a 
county with a population of over 425,000 could elect to create a consolidated human 
services agency. Act of May 20, 1987, ch. 217, sec. 1, §	153A-77, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 291, 
291, repealed by Act of June 29, 2012, ch. 126, sec. 1, §	153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 416, 
419 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-77 (2017)). The state’s two largest counties—
Wake and Mecklenburg—did just that. See Wall, supra note 252. The legislation removed 
the population threshold from that law, which opened the door for all counties to consider 
whether they should consolidate. Act of June 29, 2012, sec. 1, §	153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess. 
Laws at 419. 
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First, teacher tenure was created under a different statutory 
arrangement than the SHRA. While the career status achieved under 
the SHRA and the state teacher Career Status Law are similar, they 
are distinct laws and provide for distinct process requirements. Both 
remove the career status employee from at-will employment but do 
so under two distinct statutory regimes with their own legislative 
histories. As the two statutory regimes are different, the NCAE 
litigation does not directly implicate employees under the SHRA. 
Even so, the lessons from the NCAE litigation can inform arguments 
and potential future litigation for public employees that have lost 
their SHRA protection. 
Second, the state legislature created different processes to 
remove career status from the two sets of public employees. For 
public school teachers, career status was repealed by the state 
legislature, and the repeal was set to take place over several years. 
For employees under the SHRA, counties have an option to 
consolidate their human service entities into a new agency. If they 
elect to do so, their default option is to remove the employees from 
SHRA protection. In effect, the state law empowers a county 
commission to change the structure of its public agencies and decide 
whether SHRA protections will flow to the employees of the newly 
created agency. 
While in both cases a state act has had the effect of removing 
public employees from career status, a narrow interpretation could 
create distinguishing treatment. In the NCAE litigation, it was clear 
that the career status was removed by the state itself. If SHRA-
applicable public employees were to litigate their status removal, they 
may face the counterargument that the county board—not the state—
was the entity denying the career status. The new agency was 
authorized and created by the county board under the Consolidated 
Human Services Act, but the decision to apply SHRA protections 
was made by the county, not the state. 
Even so, the NCAE court’s reasoning may increase the strength 
of the SHRA-applicable employee’s case. In NCAE, the Career 
Status Law did not grant vesting contractual rights—it was an implied 
term in the contracts between school boards and individual teachers, 
and the state law created a framework for school boards and teachers 
to craft these contracts. Local SHRA-applicable public employees 
might argue that the SHRA provided similar background for the 
employment contracts between their public employer and themselves. 
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As the NCAE court acknowledged,267 the state law allowed for 
discretion among local public bodies in making employment 
contracts. For SHRA employees, the counties previously had this 
discretion in making contracts, and the employees may have relied on 
the SHRA as an implied term of their employment contracts. When 
they were granted tenure, these public employees would have also 
had vested contractual rights which were impaired by the state’s 
subsequent action to allow for human service agency consolidation. 
 Third, the nature of the different processes by which career 
status is removed may create confusion about whether the career 
status employee has been rehired. After the repeal of North 
Carolina’s teacher tenure law, the school district presumably 
remained intact. Although individual teachers may have lost an 
employment protection, their employer continued to exist. In the case 
of a consolidated human services agency, the county could eliminate 
an agency as a separate organizational entity and fold it into a newly 
created consolidated agency. The career status that a public employee 
had previously obtained under the SHRA might not transfer to the 
new agency, in part because their previous employer may no longer 
exist as an organization. 
If the county organization no longer exists, then all employees 
might be considered new hires or rehires outside of the SHRA 
protections. A court faced with this question could conceivably arrive 
at the conclusion that the same worker doing the same task is in the 
same job. An alternative conclusion, however, is also reasonable—
namely, the change in the organization’s legal status as an entity could 
mean that all employees must be newly hired into the new 
organization. 
Fourth, teachers are a defined group of public employees while 
human services employees are undefined in current North Carolina 
law. The SHRA protects the employees of certain county functions, 
such as emergency management, health, and social services. Other 
county functional areas are not included within the SHRA’s 
protections, such as aging, transportation, or veterans affairs. 
Counties are free to include a medley of county operations within a 
consolidated agency, and many have done so.268 As such, the 
employees of the consolidated agency may include those previously 
 
 267. See N.C. Ass’n of Educators, 368 N.C. at 788–89, 786 S.E.2d at 264. 
 268. See CHSA Organizational Charts, UNC SCH. OF GOV’T, https://www.sog.unc.edu/
resources/microsites/north-carolina-public-health-law/chsa-organizational-charts [https://perma.cc/
V4JM-8KCG]. 
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governed by the SHRA as well as those who were not.269 
Consequently, human resources policies and ordinances targeting 
these consolidated agencies may grant employee protections that 
were greater or less than county employees had previously enjoyed. 
The legal status of career employees in newly created 
consolidated agencies is currently uncertain. Similar to the career 
status for public school teachers, the SHRA provided constitutional 
property interests and due process to certain state and local 
government employees after a probationary period. Local 
governments now have an option to remove the career status 
protections for many of these SHRA-applicable local government 
employees.270 While the NCAE case does not bear directly on these 
SHRA-protected local government employees, the legal reasoning is 
similar for both public school teachers and public employees affected 
by North Carolina’s recent career status repeals at the local 
government level. Put another way, the case’s Contract Clause 
arguments have broader applicability beyond just the context of the 
public school teacher plaintiffs involved.271 
Public employees might also consider strategic interventions 
outside of litigation. As an alternative option, public employees could 
rally and organize to petition their elected representatives to reinstate 
their previous employment protections. For example, public 
employees could lobby their county commissioners to revisit the 
decision to remove SHRA protections. As the state has delegated 
decision making on extending SHRA protections to the county level, 
each county could make this determination itself for county 
employees in newly consolidated human service agencies. 
While the situations of public school teachers and that of SHRA-
applicable public employees have some distinguishing characteristics, 
the situations are comparable enough as to lead to a judicial finding 
that they are similarly situated. 
The State likely will be better prepared for future challenges to 
career status revocation than they were in the NCAE case. In 
particular, Judge Dillon’s citation to Phelps and other cases could 
 
 269. As noted above, some local management entities that handle certain 
responsibilities (e.g., mental health, substance abuse, and developmental disabilities) 
cannot be incorporated into a consolidated human services agency under certain 
consolidation options in most of North Carolina’s counties. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	153A-
76(5)–(7) (2017).  
 270. See Act of June 29, 2012, sec. 1, §	153A-77, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws at 419. 
 271. See, e.g., State of Nev. Emps. Ass’n. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 
1990) (finding that state legislation unconstitutionally impaired contractual obligations 
affecting public employees’—not limited to teachers—pensions). 
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provide a roadmap to bolster a defense of state action. Moreover, the 
SHRA statute has a different history, calls for different procedures, 
and contains different language than the state’s teacher tenure law 
and its repeal, enabling courts to potentially distinguish these 
characteristics. 
Lessons from the NCAE appellate process about relevant 
authority likely will lead future litigants to tailor authority to guiding 
North Carolina case law, especially the cases of Bailey, Faulkenbury, 
and Wiggs. Arguments that distinguish career status employment 
protection from the deferred compensation in those cases are likely to 
be emphasized in defense of the state action, as they were in Judge 
Dillon’s dissent. 
Indeed, Judge Dillon, in a unanimous North Carolina Court of 
Appeals opinion, recently cited favorably to the supreme court’s 
NCAE decision. In a 2016 case involving state magistrates and the 
aptly titled “Salary Statute,” the magistrates alleged that they had 
been promised future pay increases with a salary step schedule set by 
statute.272 Judge Dillon compared the magistrates who were suing 
over future changes to their salaries to the teachers in NCAE who 
had not yet obtained tenure.273 Ultimately, the court of appeals in that 
case found that the state legislature was “free to alter the salary 
schedule before the work supporting each [salary] step increase is 
performed by a magistrate.” 
As demonstrated in the lower levels of the NCAE litigation, the 
combination of the state constitution’s law of the land provision in 
addition to the Contract Clause appears to provide a potent 
combination in support of public employees’ position when protected 
contractual rights are threatened by state action. While the United 
States Supreme Court has more commonly addressed such cases on 
due process grounds,274 NCAE v. State provides a relatively novel 
approach to litigating public employment status. Jurists and advocates 
in public employment matters in North Carolina and elsewhere may 
be interested in adapting and applying such arguments to the facts 
before them. 
 
 272. Adams v. State, __ N.C. App. __, __, 790 S.E.2d 339, 341 (2016), rev. denied __ 
N.C. __, 803 S.E.2d 386 (2017). 
 273. Id. at __, 790 S.E.2d at 343 (“The actions of the General Assembly in suspending 
step increases for future work did not take away any benefit already earned by Plaintiffs, 
whereas in N.C. Ass’n of Educators, the successful plaintiffs had already worked the 
requisite years to earn career status.” (citation omitted)). The Contract Clause reasoning 
of NCAE and Adams v. State were also utilized in the unpublished opinion Terry v. State, 
No. 14 CVS 12342, 2017 WL 491930, at *4–7 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2017). 
 274. Recent Case, supra note 59, at 997. 
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B. Applying the Lessons of NCAE Across the Country 
Tenure of public employees is a controversial topic in North 
Carolina and across the country. The NCAE litigation provides an 
opportunity to separate the politics from the law and focus squarely 
on the legal protections afforded to public employees in exchange for 
their relatively modest salary and public service. 
While the career status of North Carolina teachers and other 
public employees has important distinctions, the lessons of the 
recently decided NCAE litigation are highly applicable for future 
advocates for SHRA-applicable local employees and are persuasive 
in other jurisdictions considering similar cases. As noted elsewhere, 
the “Contract Clause may .	.	. provide a shield against lawmakers’ 
efforts to strip tenured teachers of their tenure rights.”275 In states 
that recognize contractual rights in legislative grants of employment 
benefits, NCAE demonstrates that the grant of career status—tenure 
by another name—creates constitutionally protected contractual 
rights.276 As applied to other jurisdictions, the trial court decision and 
the court of appeals majority’s policy arguments also offer compelling 
reasons in favor of maintaining teacher tenure.277 It would behoove 
advocates on both sides of the issue to consider both the legal and 
policy arguments advanced at each stage of the NCAE litigation as 
these arguments provide a blueprint for future arguments, albeit with 
different statutory backgrounds. As noted elsewhere, the complete 
elimination of teacher tenure is not the sole means through which the 
tenure system might be reformed.278 
As a decision of a state’s highest court, the NCAE decision is 
particularly persuasive. The decision’s persuasive value increases 
when paired with a recent federal case, which came to a similar 
conclusion. That case, Elliott v. Board of School Trustees of Madison 
Consolidated Schools,279 involved the termination of a tenured school 
teacher following state action that affected the way teacher’s 
contracts were cancelled.280 At the district court level, the judge noted 
that it was undisputed that teacher tenure was a contractual right in 
 
 275. Id. at 1002. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. (citing legislative developments in New York and California that would 
streamline the process for firing and disciplining teachers accused of misconduct). 
 279. No. 1:13-cv-319-WTL-DML, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30309 (S.D. Ind. March 12, 
2015), aff’d 876 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, No.17-1259, 2018 U.S. LEXIS 3550 
(2018). 
 280. Id. at *3–6. 
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that state but that the parties disagreed as to the scope of that right. 
Ultimately, the federal judge ruled in favor of the teacher, finding 
that the state’s change to the teacher tenure system was unnecessary 
to accomplish the goal of improving teacher quality since adequate 
measures already existed to address the state’s concerns.281 The state’s 
change was therefore unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff.282 
The NCAE decision and the Elliott decision, affirmed in the 
Seventh Circuit, are far from the first cases related to public 
employment protections and the Contract Clause, and they are 
unlikely to be the last. Future litigants and jurists should take heed 
that Contract Clause arguments can be both powerful and persuasive. 
Given that the NCAE decision interpreted the language of the 
Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause, the decision may be 
particularly persuasive in other jurisdictions in which the state 
constitution’s equivalent to the Contract Clause mirrors the language 
of the Federal Constitution. Given that the language that the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina interpreted would be mirrored in 
the state constitution elsewhere, the other states’ reviewing courts 
might find the NCAE court’s reasoning highly persuasive. According 
to one recent commentator, “eliminating tenure altogether is 
impractical because doing so may violate the Contracts Clause .	.	. 
[b]ecause eliminating tenure effectively eliminates teachers’ rights to 
employment contracts that are guaranteed by the constitutions of 
both the United States and the individual states .	.	.	.”283 That 
commentator went on to conclude that in light of the legal challenges 
posed by the Contract Clause, “completely eliminating tenure is not a 
viable option for legislatures in future modifications to teacher 
tenure.”284 Several state constitutions, including those of Idaho, 
Michigan, and Indiana, have contract clause language similar to that 
of the Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause.285 
 
 281. Id. at *35–36 (first citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 
247 (1978) (“[T]here is no showing in the record before us that this severe disruption of 
contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general social problem.”); 
then citing U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1977) (“[I]t cannot be 
said that total repeal of the covenant was essential; a less drastic modification would have 
permitted the contemplated plan .	.	. a State is not free to impose a drastic impairment 
when an evident and more moderate course would serve its purposes equally well.”)). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Kimberly M. Rippeth, Running the Race: An Evaluation of Post-Race-to-the-Top 
Modifications to Teacher Tenure Laws and a Recommendation for Future Legislative 
Changes, 50 AKRON L. REV. 141, 161 (2017). 
 284. Id. at 163. 
 285. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. I, §	16 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed.”); IND. CONST. art. I, §	24 (“No 
96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018)  
1724 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
CONCLUSION 
Public employees generally enjoy greater employment 
protections in their work than their private-sector counterparts. For 
example, the United States Supreme Court in Loudermill established 
a constitutionally protected right for public employees in their 
continued public employment.286 It is well known that state actions 
that interfere with this vested right constitute a government takings 
and trigger due process protections. What is comparably rare is the 
utilization of Contract Clause-based arguments with regard to public 
employment protections. 
North Carolina is on the frontlines of an ongoing national debate 
about the appropriate level of employment protections for public 
employees. As noted above, public managers face comparably greater 
constraints in terms of personnel than their private-sector 
counterparts.287 Nearly twenty states have proposed weakening 
teacher tenure laws, but North Carolina is among the few states that 
have passed legislation barring teachers from such protection. 
Using a case study of North Carolina public-sector employees in 
education and in health departments, this analysis found that the 
ongoing debates in North Carolina present lessons for litigants and 
jurists across the country. The Supreme Court of North Carolina’s 
analysis of the Contract Clause created persuasive precedent for 
policymakers and judges in other states to consider when debating 
policy options and deciding similar cases in coming years. 
 
ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.”); 
MICH. CONST. art. I, §	10 (“No bill of attainder, ex post facto law or law impairing the 
obligation of contract shall be enacted.”). 
 286. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545–46 (1985). 
 287. Allison, supra note 199, at 221. 
